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CHAPTER 14
Where the Water Sheds: 
Disputed Deposits at the 
Ends of the Danube
Tanya Richardson
The toponym “New Land” often designates ancient land that Europeans 
“discovered” on other continents. But there is also New Land on the east-
ern periphery of the European continent where the Danube River meets 
the Black Sea. There New Land is a shape-shifting spit at the Danube’s 
Kilia mouth, formed from the depositions of sand and silt where river and 
seawater intermingle. The spit—now three kilometers long—has existed 
as a single entity in name only since it began forming roughly twenty-five 
years ago. It resembles an archipelago of sediments whose form is rear-
ranged each year by the force of winter storms. In the long term, however, 
the river’s inexorable deposition of sediments will gradually join the archi-
pelago’s “islands” into the single mound the name New Land suggests. 
When I first traveled to the end of the Starostambul Branch on June 
26, 2008, with three scientists and a warden from Ukraine’s Danube 
Biosphere Reserve, it was birds that made us aware we were approaching 
New Land. After our Crimea speedboat left behind Starostambul’s wil-
low-lined riverbanks we were surrounded for some time by the flat expan-
siveness of the transitional—still freshwater—zone between river and sea. 
The horizon’s color began to change from blue to a mottled mix of white 
and gray. As we drew closer, hundreds of black and white terns took to the 
air, abandoning their nests to the pesky interlopers who had arrived to 
inspect and count them. This is not the only colony we disturbed. As we 
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walked around and waded between the sandy “islands” of New Land’s 
archipelago we forced colonies of gulls and pelicans to take flight too. 
It was migratory birds—pelicans, swans, and herons—and the impor-
tance of places like New Land in their migration routes between Northern 
Africa and Europe that led to the establishment of a small nature reserve 
in the Soviet (now Ukrainian) part of the delta in 1967.1 However, as the 
rationales for nature conservation in the delta have multiplied, protected 
areas have expanded and now encompass almost the entire delta. The 
actively growing Kilia Delta was designated a Ramsar site in 1995 because 
the geomorphological processes that helped generate its biodiversity had 
remained largely intact due to the absence of large-scale hydraulic infra-
structure (figure 14.1). As we walked south, Yelena Zhmud—a senior sci-
entist who has lived in the delta town of Vilkove for thirty years—pointed 
out the 8km-long jetties of Romania’s Sulina Canal, which jutted out along 
the horizon in a thin, dark gray line. These long jetties—whose initial con-
struction in the nineteenth century was funded by European states 
through the Danube Commission—have been extended over the past 150 
years in order to deal with a constantly forming, ever-extending bar.2 If 
birdlife and unmodified river mouths were of little concern when the 
Sulina Canal was built, the expansion of environmental regulation and 
environmental publics in the 1980s and 1990s helped make sediments and 
wildlife major obstacles to the Ukrainian government’s construction of a 
shipping lane in the Bystre Branch in the early 2000s. 
Delta ecologies inspire awe and wonder in scientists, conservation-
ists, and tourists. Just forty kilometers north along the Black Sea Coast, 
however, Lake Sasyk—another “end” of the Danube—arouses feelings of 
dismay and disgust in local residents and environmentalists. During the 
summer months, toxic algae blooms often turn Sasyk’s water bright green. 
Residents of villages on Sasyk’s shore keep their windows closed even in 
the hot summers because of its foul smell. Adults try to prevent children 
1 G. D. Kovalenko et al., Proekt orhanizatsii teritorii ta okhorony pryrodnykh kompleksiv 
Dunaiskoho biosfernoho zapovidnika (Kharkiv: Ukrainskyi naukovo-doslidnyi institut 
ekolohichnykh problem, 2010), 22.
2 World Wildlife Fund, Sustainable Navigation in Ukraine: Alternatives in and around 
the Ukrainian Danube Delta (Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund, 2009), 21.
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Figure 14.1. Map of the Kilia Delta and the Danube Biosphere Reserve. Prepared by 
Iryna Iakovlieva. Background map courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey
Source: "Watersheds: Poetics and Politics Of the Danube River" 
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from swimming so that they do not acquire rashes, gastrointestinal ill-
nesses, and other diseases from Sasyk’s stagnant water. 
Thirty years ago, Sasyk was a lyman (Ukr., liman in Russian), an estu-
ary partially separated from the Black Sea by a sand spit.3 However, in the 
late 1970s, the Soviet authorities decided to turn the 210km-square Sasyk 
into an irrigation reservoir.4 A 14km stone and concrete dike was con-
structed along the spit to cut Sasyk off from the Black Sea (figure 14.2). Its 
salt water was pumped into the sea and its basin filled with water from the 
Danube via a canal dredged through the Danube floodplain. Although 
engineers were unable to reduce the salinity of the water to the appropri-
ate level, irrigation was permitted anyway. This damaged nearly 29,000 
hectares of land.5 Residents of affected villages and activists have cam-
paigned to no avail for nearly two decades to open the dike and restore the 
stagnating water body. Some naysayer-scientists claim algae blooms 
would persist in a Sasyk returned to the sea because of the accumulation 
of Danube sediments on Sasyk’s bottom, and that the sea would likely 
block any opening in the dike with sand. Sasyk, like the Kilia mouth, is a 
Ramsar site. In contrast to the international attention the Ukrainian gov-
ernment’s canal project has garnered, however, the struggle to deal with 
the negative consequences of filling Sasyk with Danube water has remained 
largely a regional affair. 
This chapter presents anthropological research on two environmen-
tal conflicts involving hydraulic infrastructure and turbid water at the 
Ukrainian ends of the Danube: the conflict over whether Sasyk should be 
a lake or a lyman; and the conflict over whether the Bystre Canal should 
exist as a shipping lane. I consider the ways in which water and sediments 
have played a part in generating antagonisms and alliances in these con-
flicts that have both reinforced and subverted political and administrative 
3 In this paper, place names have been transliterated using Ukrainian spellings, with the 
exception of Odessa where the use of the Russian transliteration is most widespread. 
I have used Russian and Ukrainian transliterations of personal names to reflect the 
language that individual used most in conversation with me. 
4 Ivan Rusev, Ozero Sasyka v plenu ekologicheskogo bezumiia (Kiev: Ekho Vostoka, 
1996), 3.
5 B. V. Burkinskii et al., Problemy reabilitatsii lymanu Sasyk (Odessa: Institute of Market 
Problems and Environmental-Economic Research, 2007), 5. 
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Figure 14.2. Map of Lake Sasyk and surrounding districts highlighting key components 
of the DDIS. Map by Iryna Iakovlieva
Source: "Watersheds: Poetics and Politics Of the Danube River" 
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boundaries on one of Europe’s eastern margins. My goal is to reflect on the 
Danube as a “theory machine”—an object in the world that stimulates 
theoretical formulation.6 More specifically, I consider how those who 
dwell and engineer in the proximity of turbid Danube water must deal 
with its liquid and its sediments. Engineers, scientists, administrators, 
gardeners, and fishermen are confronted with, and forced to think about, 
flow and sedimentation as intricately interrelated processes—not isolated 
or opposed ones. Their efforts to deal with water and sediments in the 
Danube Delta’s channels and marshes invite a reconsideration of a ten-
dency in many cultural analyses of globalization to posit an opposition 
between “radical mobility (‘flow’) and radical fixity (‘territory’).”7 However, 
keeping sediments and sedimentation in mind does not mean returning 
to a terra-centric cultural imaginary, to which this book seeks an alterna-
tive. The engagements I describe invite reflection on what it might mean 
for a European cultural imaginary to think through the Danube’s delta in 
terms of “an amphibious world of mobile porosities where land and water 
become each other,” words I borrow from anthropologist Hugh Raffles’ 
description of an Amazonian floodplain.8
I am not the first to mull over these issues. In his Danubian cultural 
travelogue, Claudio Magris uses his journey through the delta to reflect 
philosophically on the question of biological, literary, and metaphysical 
ends. Writing before the Soviet Union’s own end, he describes the region 
I write about as “Russia, beyond which the Danubian coordinates no long 
function” and as “a frontier [that] reeks with insecurity, fear of being 
touched . . . an obscure terror of the other,” even though it is connected 
hydrologically and ecologically to the part of the delta he describes.9 Since 
Magris wrote these lines twenty-five or so years ago, the territory he called 
“Russia” has become part of Ukraine, a country that has pursued European 
integration since the early 1990s (and, since 2014, at the cost of war). 
However, while “integration” suggests the multiplication of connections 
6 Stefan Helmreich, “Nature/Culture/Seawater,” American Anthropologist 113 (2011): 132.
7 Stuart Alexander Rockefeller, “Flow,” Current Anthropology 52 (2011): 564.
8 Hugh Raffles, In Amazonia: A Natural History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), 182.
9 Claudio Magris, Danube, trans. Patrick Creagh (London: Harvill, 2001 [1989]), 389.
Source: "Watersheds: Poetics and Politics Of the Danube River" 
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across cultural, political, and physical borders, for countries that remain 
outside the European Union (EU), “integration” has often produced dis-
connection, exclusion, and the hardening of boundaries “integration” was 
meant to soften. I therefore consider the political logics that limit the 
enactment of cultural, social, and ecological connection that thinking 
with the delta’s properties might inspire, and that occlude particular envi-
ronmental problems as a matter of concern for European publics. 
Branches, Borders, and Regulation in the Danube Delta
The Danube is Europe’s second largest river after the Volga and its most 
turbid. Roughly 80 percent (5,640 square kilometers) of the river’s delta is 
located in Romania and 20 percent (1,240 square kilometers) in Ukraine.10 
According to hydrologists and geologists the delta begins at the Izmail 
promontory. Here the Danube splits into the Tulcea Branch, which flows 
into Romania, and the Kilia Arm (Chilia in Romanian), which forms the 
international border between Romania and Ukraine and since 2007 the 
EU’s external border. At the town of Vilkove—located roughly 18km from 
the sea—the Kilia Arm divides up into a system of branches that form the 
Kilia Delta, which has some of the youngest land on the European conti-
nent. This part of the delta has existed for 350 to 400 years, though the 
areas closer to the Black Sea have existed for no more than 150 years and 
some sandy islands at the mouth of the river are only 20 years old.11 
The main factor in the formation of the Kilia Delta is the huge quan-
tity of sediments suspended in the water that are deposited as the river 
slows when it meets the sea. The Danube annually releases roughly 200 
cubic kilometers of water into the Black Sea and roughly 35,000,000 tons 
of sediments.12 The turbidity of the Danube varies heavily depending on 
the season and location and changed dramatically in the Lower Danube 
after the construction of the Iron Gates Dams I and II (1964–1972). Near 
Vilkove the turbidity can range from several grams of sediment per cubic 
10 Vasilii A. Fedorenko, Zapovednaia delta Dunaia i sudokhodstvo: Deklaratsii i realnost 
(Vilkovo: ArtVision, 2006), 7.
11 Kovalenko et al., Proekt orhanizatsii teritorii, 66–67.
12 V. N. Mikhailov, ed. Gidrologiia delty Dunaia (Moscow, 2004), 59, 227.
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meter to a couple of kilograms. Although a significant portion of the sed-
iments is deposited in the reed beds (called zaplavy in Ukrainian and 
plavni in Russian), the majority remains in the water and is deposited at 
sea. The sediments are of different types and mostly of mineral origin: silt 
(the majority), sand, and clay.13
The history of settlement and border changes in the Danube Delta 
over the past 350 years is complex. The regions Dobrogea (Romania) and 
southern Bessarabia (also known as Budzhak, now the southern part of 
Odessa Oblast) that intersect in the delta have often had the characteris-
tics of a frontier with mobile multiethnic populations. At different times, 
Tatars, Jews, Greeks, Moldovans, Russian Old Believers, Ukrainian 
Cossacks, Germans, Bulgarians, and Turks settled in this area. Vilkove 
was settled in the mid-eighteenth century by Old Believers now known as 
Lypovany (Ukr., Lipovani in Russian) in the Danube region and Ukrainian 
Cossacks who fled to the northern frontier of the Ottoman Empire to 
escape persecution by the Russian state. Tatarbunary, located in the 
Budzhak Steppe to the north of the delta, was settled much earlier (in the 
fourteenth century) by Tatars but in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries was populated by Ukrainians, Russians, Moldovans, Jews, and 
Bulgarians.14 State boundaries have shifted back and forth numerous times 
as a result of which residents of both towns have found themselves part of 
(and in Vilkove’s case sometimes divided between) the Russian Empire, 
the Ottoman Empire, Romania, the Soviet Union and, more recently, 
Ukraine.15 Between the mid-nineteenth century and 1991 Romania and 
Russia/the Soviet Union were the key actors in struggles over territory 
and borders. 
13 V. M. Tymchenko, “Tsei chudoviy ale ne holubyi Dunai,” Ekolohichni problemy 
Dunaiskoho baseina v mezhakh Ukrainy, ed. B. D. Romanenko et al. (Kiev: 
Hydroecological Association of Ukraine, 1996).
14 Aleksandr Prigarin, Russkie staroobradtsy na Dunae (Odessa: Smile-Archeodoksia, 
2010): 12–13; V. G. Siliantieva-Skorobogatova, G. Kasim, and E. Mikevich, eds. Vilkovo: 
Gorod v delte Dunaia (Odessa: Prychornomoria, 1996), 18–20; Charles Upson Clark, 
Bessarabia: Russia and Roumania on the Black Sea (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1927):70–73.
15 For Vilkovo these dates are as follows. In 1746 it was part of the Ottoman Empire; 
1812—Russian Empire; 1856—Ottomans-Romania; 1878—Russian Empire; 1918—
Romania; 1939—USSR; 1941—Romania; 1944—USSR; 1991—Ukraine.
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Whereas the Romanian delta is sparsely populated (15,000 people in 
1994) and generally perceived as a marginal place within Romania,16 the 
Ukrainian delta is fairly densely populated (68,000 people in the Kilia 
District alone in 1994) and during the Soviet period received considerable 
resources as part of state efforts to reinforce the border. Ports were expand-
ed and passenger and cargo transportation developed. Shipbuilding and 
repair factories, fishing collectives, and fish processing plants were also 
built. Dikes were built in order to reclaim part of the floodplain for rice 
and wheat cultivation.17 
The Danube Delta’s status as the largest and least damaged wetland 
complex in Europe attracted the attention of global conservation organi-
zations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One result was the creation of 
Biosphere Reserves in Ukraine and Romania, and a Transboundary 
Biosphere Reserve in 1999 as part of UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere 
Program.18 Ukraine’s Danube Biosphere Reserve (DBR) was created in 
1998 by presidential decree and expanded the Soviet-created Dunaiskii 
Plavni Nature (1981) Reserve threefold.19 During the 1990s international 
environmental regulation also expanded with the adoption of a series of 
conventions: the UNECE’s Espoo Convention (1991) which obligates sig-
natories to consult neighbors before beginning any large infrastructure 
projects; the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube 
River (ICPDR) created in 1994; the Council of Europe’s Bern Convention, 
and the EU’s various directives (e.g., on water, birds).20 Although Ukraine 
is not a EU member state, it seeks to become one and so became a signatory 
16 See, for example, Kristof Van Assche et al., “Liquid Boundaries in Marginal Marshes: 
Reconstructions of Identity in the Romanian Danube Delta,” Sociologia Ruralis 53 
(2008): 115–133.
17 World Bank, Global Environment Facility, Ukraine: Danube Delta Biodiversity (Project 
Document no. 12575 UA, 1994), 7. 
18 Kristof Van Assche et al., “Delineating Locals: Transformations of Knowledge/Power 
and the Governance of the Danube Delta,” Journal of Environmental Values 13 (2011): 
8–9.
19 Kovalenko et al., Proekt orhanizatsii teritorii, 22–23.
20 Fedorenko, Zapovednaia delta Dunaia i sudokhodstvo, 16–18; Mari Koyano, “Effective 
Implementation of International Environmental Agreements: Learning Lessons from 
the Danube Delta Conflict,” in Public Interest Rules of International Law: Towards 
Effective Implementation, ed. Teruo Komori and Karel Wellens (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2009), 261–262.
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to these conventions and participates in a number of environmental man-
agement initiatives. 
Riparian Research Run Aground
This chapter’s emphasis on sedimentation grows out of fieldwork I have 
been conducting in the Ukrainian part of the Danube Delta since 2008. I 
chose to do research in Vilkove, a mixed Ukrainian-Old Believer town of 
roughly eight thousand people because I was interested in the forms of life 
Danubian flows made possible in the context of expanding environmental 
regulation and a changing political economy. This research interest 
emerged out of my realization that my study of the Black Sea port of 
Odessa had neglected residents’ practical and imaginative relationships 
with the sea.21 I am not sure whether this neglect stemmed from my infor-
mants’ disconnection from the sea (except for leisure) or because my own 
terra-centric thinking made me inattentive to Odessans’ maritime rela-
tions. I anticipated that in Vilkove, a town seemingly so directly connect-
ed with the Danube, I would glean insights about a world in which riparian 
matters were prominent actants.22
As always, after dreaming up a project, one is rather abruptly brought 
to earth (quite literally so in my case) when trying to pursue it in practice. 
Although aware of the fact that many of Vilkove’s residents lived land-
based lives, I did not anticipate the difficulties I would face being with 
people on the river. Because owning and operating boats is regulated 
(additionally so because it is a border zone) and requires a particular skill 
set, I did not have independent means for “going with the flow.” Gardeners 
were reluctant to take me because they often needed space in their boat to 
transport their harvest or tools. Because fishing is a predominantly male 
sphere, my access to the river via fishermen was limited. Many residents 
were giving up their boats because they were abandoning their gardens 
and were having troubles paying the costly registration and docking fees. 
21 Tanya Richardson, Kaleidoscopic Odessa: History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
22 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 10. 
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It has been easier to be on the water on tourist excursions and research 
trips with scientists from the DBR. However, most of my time in Vilkove 
has been spent rather firmly planted on the river’s banks. The story of my 
research thus far is the story of the difficulties of studying the Danube 
riverworld—and hence a story of the grounded anthropologist.23
I have traveled almost as often by bus toward Tatarbunary and Odessa 
as I have by boat in the direction of the Danube’s mouth. This is partly 
because of the connection I made with activists in the district centre of 
Tatarbunary who are campaigning to restore Lake Sasyk’s marine ecosys-
tem. In contrast to the conflict over the Bystre Canal—which had caught 
my eye because of its international resonances—I was unaware of the 
problem of Sasyk before I began my research. Aleksandr Voloshkevich, 
the director of the DBR, introduced me to the key activist Iryna 
Vykhrystiuk. He had become involved in 2004 when some territories 
around Sasyk became part of the DBR when it was rezoned. The connec-
tions that the Danubian flow opened up for me as a researcher were not 
those I had anticipated in conceiving a research project about the river; 
they took me overland to another body of water whose ontological status, 
including its relationship to the Danube, was far from settled. 
Muddy Musings on Aqueous Imaginaries
Seawater has long served as a theory machine in anthropology.24 However, 
the use of water as a form in cultural and social theory intensified with the 
search for alternatives to the nation-state as a model for understanding 
23 This paper is based on research conducted in Vilkove and Tatarbunary between June 
2008 and September 2012 (June 2008, September–November 2009, May 2010, August 
2010, May–June 2011, August–September 2012) as well as documents collected during 
this time primarily from the Danube Biosphere Reserve and the NGO Vidrodzhennia. 
This research has been funded by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
Standard Grant “Bordering Nature in the Danube Delta: Conservation, Politics and 
Place-Making in a Ukrainian-Romanian Transboundary Biosphere Reserve.” I am 
grateful to the following people for the support they have provided in conducting this 
research and writing this paper: Sergei Dyatlov, Vasilii and Akulina Fedorenko, Derek 
Hall, Nikolai Izotov, Kristina Lyons, Matthew Miller, Aleksandr Prigarin, Oleg Rubel, 
Igor Studennikov, Aleksandr Voloshkevich, Iryna Vykhrystiuk, and Mikhail and 
Yelena Zhmud.
24 Helmreich, “Nature/Culture/Seawater,” 132–133.
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socio-cultural connection under conditions of globalization.25 In the late 
1980s scholars such as Arjun Appadurai, Manuel Castells, and Ulf Hannerz 
popularized the language of “flow” in analyses of globalization.26 This 
trend has given rise to a number of different anthropological critiques. 
First, globalization intensifies attachments to place and assertions of sov-
ereignty as much as it produces deterritorialization.27 Second, the opposi-
tion between radical mobility (flow) and radical fixity (territory) fails to 
capture the complex interplay of these processes and the different ways in 
which they are valued by people in different locations.28 Third, cultural 
theorists of globalization have tended to take scientific (especially hydro-
logical) descriptions of water’s form—particularly its fluidity—as ontolog-
ically given.29
Oceans and seas are the paradigmatic form of water circulating 
through the cultural theories of globalization that Ballinger, Rockefeller, 
and Helmreich critique. Rivers, like oceans, also invite us to think about 
and with flow.30 For example, Pohler and Schillmeier suggest that examin-
ing the multiplicity of Danubian nature/cultures “enacted by the flow of 
the river” can help reimagine Europe as a fluid space and transgress con-
ceptual and political boundaries.31 While engaging in a helpful provoca-
tion, these authors nevertheless essentialize the river as an agent of flow. 
Channels, floodplains, deltas, and river-diversion projects such as the 
Sasyk Reservoir provide alternatives for thinking about rivers that do not 
25 See, for example, Cecilia Chen, Janine McLeod, and Astrid Neimanis, eds., Thinking 
with Water (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2013). 
26 Rockefeller, “Flow,” 560.
27 Pamela Ballinger, “Watery Spaces, Globalizing Places: Ownership and Access in 
Postsocialist Croatia,” in European Responses to Globalization: Resistance, Adaptation, 
and Alternatives, ed. Janet Laible and Henri J. Barkey (Berlin: Springer, 2006), 156.
28 Rockefeller, “Flow,” 562; Jeanne Feaux de la Croix, “Moving Metaphors We Live By: 
Water and Flow in the Social Sciences and around Hydroelectric Dams in Kyrgyzstan,” 
Central Asian Review 30 (2011): 487. 
29 Helmreich, “Nature/Culture/Seawater,” 138.
30 See Franz Krause, “What to Do about Flow? A Conversation about a Contested 
Concept,” Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society 39 
(2014): 89; and Veronica Strang, Gardening the World: Agency, Identity, and the 
Ownership of Water (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).
31 Michael Schillmeier and Wiebke Pohler, “The Danube and Ways of Imagining Europe,” 
Sociological Review 58 (2010): 28.
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focus exclusively on flow. For example, river banks’ resistance to river 
currents inspired Anna Tsing to think in terms of the way in which the 
contemporary world is not just a space of flows but also of friction.32 In the 
case of Sasyk, the Danube’s water is stuck and stagnant. 
Floodplains and marshes along rivers and in deltas challenge land/
water distinctions more profoundly than Tsing’s image of river channeling 
does. Marshes—or wetlands as they are now more commonly known—
are in between land and water and may be water at one moment and land 
at another.33 As “matter-in-transition” they challenge not only the mod-
ernist nature/culture divide,34 but also the related land/water one.35 “Liquid 
life” and flow captivate Magris’ imagination most, as we can see in lines 
such as the “delta is the great abandonment to the flow, the liquid universe 
that frees and loosens things, leaves that let go and surrender to the cur-
rent.”36 However, Magris also provides a wonderful description of matter 
in transition: “the mud is gradually becoming transformed into dry land, 
the bottomless ooze turns to soil on which to build, plant, harvest.”37 
Magris’ narrative oscillates between the Euclidean geometry of the 
regulated river and the fractal geometry of the unregulated river in an 
instructive way. Magris refers to projects and works needed to ensure the 
navigability of the Danube as “Regulation,” citing a letter from Count 
Istvan Szechenyi, “pioneer of communication in southeastern Europe.”38 
Although Magris himself does not use the term “fractal” his description of 
the unregulated river delta evokes such properties: “branches and rivulets 
and ramifications . . . wander off on their own,” and their “end is every-
where throughout the . . . delta.”39 The term “fractal” is associated with 
32 Anna Tsing, “The Global Situation,” Cultural Anthropology 15 (2000): 330.
33 Rod Giblett, Postmodern Wetlands: Culture, History, Ecology (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1996), 3. 
34 Stuart McLean, “Black Goo: Forceful Encounters with Matter in Europe’s Muddy 
Margins,” Cultural Anthropology 26 (2011): 592.
35 Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, “Beyond the Water-Land Binary in Geography: Water/lands of 
Bengal Re-visioning Hybridity,” ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical 
Geography 13 (2014): 505.
36 Magris, Danube, 395. 
37 Ibid., 393.
38 Ibid., 389.
39 Ibid., 390, 396.
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mathematician Benoît Mandelbrot, who was interested in “describing, 
calculating and thinking about shapes that are irregular, fragmented, 
jagged and broken up.”40 Fractals are characterized by self-similarity of a 
form across scales even though to the human eye they may seem compli-
cated and highly variable: “parts of fractals are complete replications of 
the whole and the whole is a version of any one of the parts.”41 Coasts and 
deltas—where rivers end—were some of Mandelbrot’s key examples. In 
the cases described here, attempts to harness the river’s flow for irrigation 
and shipping by creating sharp divisions between land and water (Bystre’s 
bar), and fresh and salt water (Lake Sasyk) were undermined by intermin-
gled and oscillating deltaic and coastal matter. However, despite the 
“objections” of these matters and their environmentalist allies, the con-
temporary politics of the Danube River seem to be shaped more by geo-
metric and territorial logics than by logics informed by the rivers’ physical 
properties (e.g., fractality) or diverse forms (e.g., its delta). 
Sasyk as a Settling Pond 
According to the official map of the International Commission for the 
Protection of the Danube River, once Danube water enters Lake Sasyk it 
ceases to be part of the Danube basin.42 However, according to the maps 
of Ukraine’s Danube Basin Department, Sasyk is part of the Danube 
watershed even though the Kohilnik and Sarata rivers that feed it are not.43 
Although Sasyk is listed on official maps as a “lake,” activists point out that 
its current state is rather that of reservoir because it is a human-created 
and human-regulated freshwater body. To activists, however, Sasyk is 
really a lyman. Lymans on the Black Sea’s northwest coast were once river 
valleys that, when flooded with seawater became estuaries or lagoons 
40 James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (London: Minerva, 1996), 98.
41 Sarah Green, Notes from the Balkans: Locating Marginality and Ambiguity on the 
Greek-Albanian Border (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 134. 
42 For a map of the whole Danube River Basin, see https://www.icpdr.org/main/publica-
tions/maps-danube-river-basin-district-management-plan-2009, accessed June 27, 
2015. 
43 For a map of the Ukrainian sub-basins, see http://www.dbuvr.od.ua/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=63&Itemid=5, accessed June 27, 2015.
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partially separated from the sea by sand spits.44 The “freshening” (oprisne-
nie) of Sasyk began in 1976 during the construction of the Danube-
Dniester Irrigation System (DDIS). This Brezhnev-era “project of the 
century”45 diverted Danube water that was being “wasted” in the Black Sea 
in order to irrigate the drought-prone southern Ukrainian steppe. The 
Danube-Sasyk canal that channels river water into Sasyk can be consid-
ered an artificial branch of the Danube, though its straight, even Euclidean 
geometric form contrasts sharply with the river’s winding “natural” 
branches.
For residents and local activists Sasyk’s connection to the Danube has 
only caused harm to regional ecologies and to human health. On August 
13, 2010, I joined activist Iryna Vykhrystiuk on a visit to Borysivka—one 
of the affected villages—where she planned to update residents about the 
campaign. When I asked some of the elderly men and women who had 
gathered if they could explain what had happened, one man in his late 
sixties began: “The water used to be salty but it was clean. We observed it. 
Now, if there are warm days, the water turns green and there is a terrible 
smell.” A second elderly man added: “On that side [of Sasyk] they ruined 
the land. On this side, they suffocated us with smells.” An elderly woman 
continued: “We can’t swim. There used to be many birds. Now there are 
none.” They spoke about the saline water in their wells, shore erosion, ill-
nesses, sick cows, and dead fish and lamented the loss of therapeutic muds 
that had attracted people from Romania during the interwar period and 
across the Soviet Union after World War II. However, despite their 
decades-long efforts to restore Sasyk as a lyman, the dike remains in place, 
Sasyk continues to “rot” (their term), and the DDIS continues to receive 
state funding even though irrigation was banned in 1994 and ceased com-
pletely in 2000. Officials in the state water authority have successfully 
multiplied associations with human and nonhuman actors (e.g., fishing 
and regional state officials, freshwater fish, pipes, and pumps) in ways that 
44 Ivan Vlasenko and Volodymyr Polishchuk, Hirki uroky Sasyka (Artsiz: Petrov, 2008 
[1989]), 3–5.
45 Paul Josephson, “‘Projects of the Century’ in Soviet History: Large-Scale Technologies 
from Lenin to Gorbachev,” Technology and Culture 36 (1995): 519.
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have enabled freshwater Sasyk to withstand activists’ challenges.46 
Meanwhile, the longer Danube sediments accumulate, the more challeng-
ing and uncertain a restoration project becomes.
Danube water ended up in a Black Sea lyman as a result of Soviet land 
reclamation policies during the 1960s and 1970s. The Ministry of Land 
Reclamation and Water Resources came up with a number of projects 
involving inter-basin transfer of water to increase agricultural productiv-
ity, the best known of which is the Siberian River Diversion Project.47 In 
southern Ukraine, Soviet development strategy focused on intensifying 
agriculture and increasing the use of industrial fertilizers and pesticides. 
The dryland farming techniques (Ukr., boharni rilnitstvo) which still pre-
dominated in the region, were considered inefficient because some land 
always remained fallow and because crop productivity was dependent on 
rainfall.48 Soviet Ukraine’s Ministry of Water Resources conceived the 
Danube-Dnipro Complex to divert 16 cubic km annually from the Danube 
through a canal system to a series of reservoirs, of which Sasyk would be 
one. 8.7 million hectares of land were to be irrigated in the hopes of 
increasing the production of grain and animal feed.49
The first stage—the DDIS—was initiated in 1976 and involved turn-
ing Sasyk into a reservoir that also doubled as a settling pond. After the 
construction of the dike and the 5m-deep, 100m-wide, and 13.5km-long 
Danube-Sasyk canal, Sasyk’s saltwater was pumped into the Black Sea and 
its basin “washed” with fresh (though extremely turbid) Danube water. 
Project engineers thought that “washing” Sasyk three times over 1.5 years 
would ensure a level of dissolved salts of one gram per liter. This would be 
maintained by the inflow from the Danube and regular pumping.50 The 
purpose of Sasyk-as-reservoir was thus twofold: first, to accumulate 
Danube water to irrigate 29,000 hectares of land east of Sasyk in the 
46 Tanya Richardson, “The Politics of Multiplication in a Failed Soviet Irrigation Project, 
Or, How Sasyk Has Been Kept From the Sea,” Ethnos 81 (2016): 125. 
47 Michael L. Bressler, “Water Wars: Siberian Rivers, Central Asian Deserts, and the 
Structural Sources of a Policy Debate,” in Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the 
Russian Far East, ed. Stephen Kotkin and David Wolff (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
1995), 247.
48 Vlasenko and Polishchuk, Hirki uroky Sasyka, 5.
49 Rusev, Ozero Sasyka v plenu ekologicheskogo bezumiia,14.
50 Ibid., 10.
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Tatarbunary and Sarata districts; and second, to serve as a settling pond 
for the sediments and toxins accumulated by the Danube’s water in its 
travels through Europe and the Danube-Sasyk Canal. 
Although the reservoir never had water with a composition suitable 
for irrigation, it was used to irrigate large tracts of land until 1994 (and 
smaller ones until 2000). Sasyk’s water remained saline because salt water 
continued to enter the basin from springs connected to underground cav-
erns. When sodium ions and chloride salts persisted at unacceptably high 
levels, engineers raised Sasyk’s level by half a meter by allowing more 
water to enter from the Danube. Although tests on the first 5,000 hectares 
showed that levels of dissolved salts—in which sodium chloride predom-
inated—were too high (at 1.6 grams per liter instead of one g/1) and did 
not have a pH level acceptable for the soil (8.5 instead of 7), in 1981, 18,800 
hectares were irrigated.51 Despite the damage to soils, engineers were 
allowed to continue experimenting to reduce the prevalence of sodium 
chloride and to modify the pH level by adding gypsum and acid to the 
water.52 To compensate for soil damage and poor agricultural productivity, 
more chemical fertilizers were used, increasing the runoff into Sasyk.
Opposition to the DDIS emerged under socialism and intensified 
after its demise as the ecological situation worsened. Activist efforts to 
deal with the situation have involved challenging an assemblage that 
includes water, the dike, pumping equipment and canals, regulation, and 
officials in the DDIS (a state enterprise), different branches of the State 
Water Department, the fishing committee, district and oblast state admin-
istrations, the Ministry of the Environment, and some research institutes. 
In the early 1990s, a parliamentary deputy helped found an NGO called 
Vidrodzhennia after residents complained about the high frequency of 
rashes, circulatory diseases, and certain cancers. Iryna Vykhrystiuk, a res-
ident of Tatarbunary and an engineer by training, left her job at the 
Ecological Inspection Agency to take on the leadership of this organiza-
tion because her superiors actively blocked her attempts to answer resi-
dents’ questions about Sasyk’s water quality. 
51 Ibid., 17.
52 Ibid., 19. 
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Iryna and her fellow activists have formed their own associations 
with things such as toxins, ions, salts, and mud via scientists who will testify 
to, rather than conceal, their presence.53 They began by demonstrating the 
existence of a human collective concerned about pollution. A survey of 
five thousand villagers in Belolissia, Borysivka, Trapivka, Lyman, and 
Hlyboke in the spring of 1997 confirmed that 97 percent wanted Sasyk 
restored as a lyman.54 Then, like citizens’ groups around the world, the 
NGO sought to generate scientific evidence about Sasyk’s environments.55 
It organized an independent study using a small grant from a US founda-
tion because the multivolume expert study conducted in 1994 remained 
inaccessible. Tests demonstrated that levels of zinc, lead, cadmium, nickel, 
copper, and chromium in Sasyk’s muds were several times higher than the 
accepted norm and were elevated in fish. Nitrate levels in the water were 
also higher than the sanitary norm for bodies of water in which fish are 
harvested. This modest expertise enabled the activists to attract the atten-
tion of more prominently placed experts, whose reports confirmed and 
expanded the findings about the problems created by the DDIS, and even-
tually culminated in official, state-funded reports.
While activists’ initial efforts focused on demonstrating harm to 
regional ecologies and human health, they later expanded their focus to 
include the economic and technical aspects of the DDIS and its effects. 
This shift to issues of economic efficiency was a response to the assertions 
of DDIS and Oblast State Water Department (OSWD) officials that open-
ing the dike would be a costly endeavor that would only worsen the situa-
tion.56 However, oblast authorities ignored the technical-economic report 
that Vidrodzhennia commissioned from an engineering firm that demon-
strated the feasibility of opening the dike and how a restored ecology 
would benefit a greater number of people (because officials were either 
from the DDIS and the OSWD or allied with them). The NGO began 
53 Richardson, “The Politics of Multiplication,” 139.
54 Vidrodzhennia, Ecobulletin, 4 (1998): 1. 
55 See, for example, Eeva Berglund, Knowing Nature, Knowing Science: An Ethnography 
of Local Environmental Activism (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 2001); and Tim 
Choy, Ecologies of Comparison: An Ethnography of Endangerment in Hong Kong 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011). 
56 Vidrodzhennia, Ecobulletin 25 (2000): 2–3.
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pressuring the Ministry of the Environment, which in 2004 commis-
sioned a study from its own Institute on Ecological Problems. This two 
hundred-page state-funded (and sanctioned) expert report not only con-
firmed earlier findings but also expanded the range of data demonstrating 
the problems with Sasyk’s water.57 
Officials from the DDIS and OSWD stymied the campaign to restore 
Sasyk in other ways too: through public statements and covert, at times 
illegal, actions. During NGO-organized roundtables, these officials have 
emphasized the region’s water scarcity and the need to keep Sasyk fresh. 
They claim villagers are really concerned about a source of fresh water for 
drinking and domestic uses, not pollution, and that ecological problems 
do not stem from the DDIS infrastructure but rather from runoff, poor 
drainage, and poor circulation that proper technical inputs could fix. 
Indeed, in 2002 the OSWD head was elected to the Odessa Oblast Council, 
where as head of the ecological committee he allocated funds (intended 
for nature protection) to restore the main pump and deal with erosion 
while also overseeing the dismantling of other pumping stations for sale 
as scrap metal.58
Water and irrigation officials also tried to prevent growing recogni-
tion of Sasyk’s pollution by concealing information, producing test results 
at odds with those demonstrating the presence of pollutants, and chang-
ing the status of Sasyk from a water (vodohospodarske) to a fish-harvesting 
(rybohospodarske) reservoir. Faced with mounting evidence that Sasyk’s 
water was unsuitable for irrigation, the cost of maintaining the DDIS, and 
the declining fish catch (10kg/ha instead of 40), in 2003 the heads of the 
OWSD and the State Fishing Committee (SFC) and the governor of 
Odessa Oblast changed Sasyk’s status so that artificial stocking could be 
renewed in order to enhance commercial fishing. In changing Sasyk’s 
status, the usual procedures involving various agencies to check water 
quality (e.g., sanitary-epidemiological service, veterinary service) were 
57 See O. G. Vasenko et al., Report: Social-Economic and Ecological Justification for 
Renewing the Hydrological Regime of Lake Sasyk (Kharkiv: Ukrainian Scientific-
Research Institute of Ecological Problems, Ministry of Environmental Protection of 
Ukraine, 2004). 
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bypassed.59 This decision multiplied freshwater Sasyk’s allies and the net-
works interested in keeping the dike in place.60 
Frustrated by the authorities’ failure to respond to the Ministry of the 
Environment’s report, residents and Vidrodzhennia activists organized a 
demonstration on the dike on Ukraine’s independence day in 2008. Five 
hundred residents of all ages participated in digging up the sandy portion 
of the dike to express their frustration at the authorities’ failure to respond 
to their demands to restore Sasyk. District officials’ participation in the 
event and sustained media attention (activists were on the dike for a 
week) forced Odessa Oblast’s governor to respond. A working group was 
set up in the fall of 2008, and a year later the Oblast Council passed a 
resolution calling for the dike to be opened and the ecosystem to be 
restored. However, the process stalled when it came time to design the 
project. OSWD and other officials insisted that in addition to the resto-
ration of Sasyk itself, the project should (a) provide irrigation water from 
the Danube-Sasyk canal to Sasyk’s east side and (b) secure a source of 
drinking water for villagers in the Kilia District town of Prymorske who 
now get their water from the Danube-Sasyk canal. As a result, the funds 
for the project design were insufficient and no project design was com-
pleted before the end of the fiscal year. The deadline for using funds 
passed shortly after the presidential election that brought Viktor 
Yanukovich to power. In August 2010, the oblast-level process was shut 
down and transferred back to Kyiv. The interdepartmental group formed 
to deal with the situation met once to reopen the question of whether the 
dike should be removed. The process remained stalled for the entirety of 
Yanukovich’s rule. 
When I visited Borysivka on August 13, 2010, the record-breaking 
heat wave that caused massive forest fires and crop damage in Russia and 
Ukraine was still raging. Even for those accustomed to the hot summers 
of the Budzhak Steppe, the 40 degree Celsius heat (in the shade) was pun-
ishing. As we made the 10km drive from Tatarbunary to Borysivka, Ira 
commented that many of the fires burning in Russia that summer were 
occurring on land that had been reclaimed from peat bogs at the time that 
59 Iryna Vykhrystiuk, “Ne mala baba klopotu,” Oikumen 24, no. 4 (2010): 2–3.
60 Tanya Richardson, “Politics of Multiplication,” 145.
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Sasyk was turned into a reservoir. “There they reclaimed swamps, here 
they irrigated” (Rus., U nikh sushili, u nas ovodnili). 
Toward the end of the two and a half hour meeting, Ira spoke about 
the 2009 report that scientists had written about Sasyk justifying the dike’s 
removal. She described what Sasyk would become if the campaign did not 
continue: “For many years, the Danube waters have flowed into Sasyk. The 
sediments are full of heavy metals. They enter plants. The fish eat them. 
We eat the fish. We breathe the foul air. This is what makes us sick.” The 
bottom of Sasyk was filling in with sediments. Its morphology had changed 
in the past thirty years. Sediments from the Danube and shore erosion 
had shrunk the average depth of Sasyk by nearly half a meter. Even though 
the actual volume of Danube water that enters the reservoir has fallen by 
half, in an average year, it still dumps 130,000 tons of sediments into Sasyk; 
on average 40,000–50,000 tons of sediments enter from shore erosion.61 
Ira explained that this was troubling because many of the saltwater springs 
that supplied Sasyk with seawater had been covered over by sediments, 
which would make restoration more difficult. Further, every year organic 
matter from the algae blooms, exacerbated by the poor water exchange, 
settles to the bottom, adding to this layer of sludge. After discussing the 
expansion of reeds along the banks of Sasyk and in the north, Ira sketched 
out a dystopian future: “Eventually, Sasyk will disappear. As evaporation 
intensifies in the summer, more and more territory will fill in. It will 
become radioactive mud.” 
Dredging, Depositions, and Shipping Disputes
The Ukrainian government’s decision in 2003 to build a shipping canal in 
the Bystre Branch in the Danube Biosphere Reserve’s core zone provoked 
one of the largest environmental conflicts in independent Ukraine.62 Its 
official opening in 2004 on August 24—Ukraine’s independence day—
was conducted with great fanfare and included a visit from then President 
Leonid Kuchma. The official goal was the circulation of more cargo-loaded 
ships through Ukraine’s part of the delta and more money through 
61 Vasenko et al., Social-Economic and Ecological Justification, 54. 
62 Fedorenko, Zapovednaia delta Dunaia i sudokhodstvo, 2.
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regional and national economies. After more than a decade of shady pri-
vatizations, economic decline, and decreasing opportunities for stable 
full-time employment, residents along the Danube backed the canal proj-
ect in the hopes of economic revival. Transport officials not only underes-
timated the willingness and ability of DBR staff and their environmentalist 
allies domestically and internationally to draw attention to the threats this 
posed to the delta’s ecologies. They also undermined their own agendas by 
failing to account for sedimentation at the Bystre’s mouth. However, over 
the past several years, former opponents have come to share a common 
concern about the reduced volume of water flowing through the Kilia 
Arm and increased sedimentation. 
Since the second half of the nineteenth century, the Sulina and Sf. 
Gheorghe Canals in Romania have undergone large-scale modifications 
to the delta for navigation purposes. European powers formed the Danube 
Commission in order to oversee the improvement of navigation on the 
river after the Treaty of Paris in 1856, which ended the Crimean War.63 
Even though the Kilia Arm was the largest, for strategic and practical rea-
sons, experts focused on Sulina and Gheorghe. On the practical side, the 
Kilia Arm was more winding and complex and thus difficult to channel. 
Geopolitically, European leaders did not expect imperial Russia to recon-
cile itself to the loss of part of the delta after the Crimean War. Indeed, in 
1878 Russia advanced its border from the Dniester River back to the Kilia 
Arm of the Danube.64 
After extensive research, Charles Hartley, an English engineer hired 
to study shipping possibilities in the Danube, concluded that the Sf. 
Gheorghe Channel was the best option for creating a deep channel. 
However, because of the cost of building the locks required to maintain it, 
the decision was taken to temporarily make use of Sulina by building tem-
porary jetties.65 Eventually, this temporary canal became permanent. 
Dikes were reinforced, and the canal was dredged and straightened. While 
63 Constantin Ardeleanu, “The European Commission of the Danube and the Results of 
Its Technical and Administrative Activity on the Safety of Navigation, 1856–1914,” 
International Journal of Maritime History, 23 (2011): 88–92. 
64 Fedorenko, Zapovednaia delta Dunaia i sudokhodstvo, 9.
65 Nikolai Shtefan, “Delta Dunaia. Khronika spora cheloveka s pryrodoi,” Sudokhodstvo 
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the Romanian Canal Administration maintains the Sulina Canal at a 
depth of 7.2 meters, jetties must periodically be extended because of the 
continuously forming bar. 
Only in the late 1950s was there any success in maintaining a deep 
channel (4m) in the Kilia Delta. Russian authorities had tried, with little 
success, to dredge shipping canals in the Kilia Delta along the Polunochnyi 
Branch at the beginning of the century, and through the Ochakiv Branch 
toward the end of World War I.66 In the 1950s, the Prorva Canal could be 
maintained by removing 150,000 to 200,000 cubic meters of sediments 
annually.67 However, by the mid-1980s this amount increased twentyfold 
and the canal required round-the-clock dredging because the Ochakiv 
Branch of which it was part was gradually becoming extinct.68 Prorva 
ceased to operate in 1994 in the early years of Ukraine’s existence as an 
independent state because the state lacked funds to dredge the canal and 
because of the decline of shipping in the region due to the Yugoslav Wars 
of Succession. As a result, Romania captured the market for deep channel 
shipping. A 1997 attempt to dredge Prorva and renew shipping failed; 
within half a year the canal again filled with sediments.
Against this backdrop, the Ukrainian Transport Ministry—more spe-
cifically Minister Heorhii Kirpa and the state enterprise Delta Lotsman—
introduced a project to renew shipping in the Kilia Delta. The manner in 
which the government selected Bystre resulted in violations of national 
legislation and international treaty obligations.69 The government selected 
the Bystre option because it was the cheapest and the quickest to imple-
ment and would enable them to reap political and economic dividends in 
the run-up to the presidential elections in the fall of 2004. The DBR and 
the Academy of Sciences objected to the Bystre option—and not to ship-
ping in the delta per se, as often portrayed in the national media. They 
argued instead for the construction of an artificial canal with locks through 
reserve territory that was part of the buffer zone (and thus considered less 
66 Ibid., 16 
67 Ibid., 17. 
68 Ibid., 17.
69 Fedorenko, Zapovednaia delta Dunaia i sudokhodstvo, 16–17; Koyano, “Effective 
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valuable in terms of biodiversity conservation than Bystre’s mouth).70 
Because speed was of the essence, the environmental assessment report 
underestimated potential environmental impacts while the imperative of 
national and international consultations was side-stepped. 
After a 2003 Cabinet of Ministers resolution definitively selected the 
Bystre option, the government informed UNESCO but did not share 
information with the Romanian government, as it was obliged to do under 
the Espoo Convention. The Ukrainian environmental organizations 
worked with the DBR staff to initiate a national and international cam-
paign to “save the DBR.” Because of the configuration of state power in the 
latter years of Kuchma’s rule, Ministry of Transport officials were able to 
make use of audits and law enforcement agencies, state and private media 
(at the time almost all loyal to Kuchma), state enterprises, and town and 
regional councils to pressure the reserve personnel to back down.71 A law-
suit was opened to invalidate the reserve’s title to the land and demon-
strate that the bodies of water had never actually belonged to it. When the 
outcome seemed uncertain, Kirpa arranged a presidential decree rezon-
ing the reserve, so that Bystre and adjacent lands would be part of the 
anthropogenic rather than core zone of the reserve.72 Finally, after the 
canal was opened in 2004, just prior to the contentious elections that led 
to the Orange Revolution, the head of Delta Lotsman instigated a criminal 
case against the reserve in an attempt to discredit administrators and 
remove them from their posts.73 The criminal case was dropped after the 
Orange Revolution, and after a lengthy court procedure Ukraine’s Supreme 
Court ruled that the reserve held a valid title to the land. 
In this conflict between economic development and conservation 
agendas, Delta Lotsman emphasized the power of humans to conquer 
70 Fedorenko, Zapovednaia delta Dunaia i sudokhodstvo, 25. 
71 Tanya Richardson, “On the Limits of Liberalism in Participatory Environmental 
Governance: Conflict and Conservation in Ukraine’s Danube Delta,” Development and 
Change 24 (2015): 426–427. 
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nature while the DBR underscored nature’s power to subvert human projects. 
Both parties used hydrological and ecological evidence to speculate about 
the behavior of water and silt in the mouth of the Bystre Canal. Delta 
Lotsman emphasized Bystre’s suitability for shipping because the channel 
was the most active (with regard to the speed and volume of traffic) and 
the size of the bar to be dredged was narrower than Starostambul 
(3 instead of 6km); it was therefore least at risk for sedimentation. Within 
three months, a canal could be up and running, which meant a grand 
opening could be conducted during the 2004 election campaign.74 Canal 
proponents claimed it would not only boost the regional economy by 
reviving port and ship-repair enterprises but would also achieve the geo-
political objective of decreasing reliance on Romania’s canals. The experts 
who designed the project downplayed historical evidence about the scale 
of deposition and the costs and environmental impact of removing it.
DBR administrators claimed that the branch’s high sediment load 
and the force of Black Sea currents at the channel’s mouth would under-
mine the state’s economic development agenda. Their arguments drew on 
Hartley’s research on the hydrology and geomorphology of the delta for 
the Danube Commission and on other engineering expertise.75 Hartley 
demonstrated that bars increase in size and extend further out from shore 
after every high water period.76 Their specific shape and size is dynamic 
and depends on wind and wave action during flooding. While they form 
perpendicular to the channel, they extend in a southerly direction rather 
than to the north. Reserve staff felt somewhat vindicated when winter 
storms reduced the depth of water over Bystre’s bar to its original three 
meters in the canal’s first year of operation. When I first visited the canal 
in 2008, dredging was being carried out for a third time to ensure a canal 
depth of 6 meters. Over the next year and a half, the 410m-long breakwa-
ter was extended to 2.5 km to protect the dredged bar from siltation due 
to long-shore currents. Evidence from 2005 on the passage of ships 
74 Interview with Vasilii Fedorenko (May 30, 2011).
75 Fedorenko, Zapovednaia delta Dunaia i sudokhodstvo, 7.
76 Charles A. Hartley, “Description of the Delta of the Danube and of the Works 
Recently Executed at the Sulina Mouth,” Minutes of the Proceedings of the Institute of 
Civil Engineers 21 (1862): 282. 
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demonstrated that few ships of the maximum draft actually used the 
canal, and most that did could have used the still functional artificial canal 
from the Zhebrian Bay to the Ochakiv Branch.77 Although little evidence 
is available on the scale of the cargo, what is clear is that shipping has not 
led to the revival of ports or ship-repairing factories in the Ukrainian 
Danube towns of Vilkove, Kilia, Izmail and Reni.
After Viktor Yushchenko was elected president in January 2005 on a 
platform of democratic reform and EU integration, Ukraine’s government 
began to provide some of the information requested by various parties 
and opened a dialogue with EU and Romanian officials.78 However, work 
was resumed on the canal contrary to the expectations (and wishes) of 
European and Romanian officials. As a result, in 2008, the member states 
of the Espoo Convention responded to Romania’s complaint by warning 
Ukraine that it was in violation of its agreements to consult on possible 
transboundary environmental consequences of infrastructure or other 
developments. However, some analysts claim that had work not been 
resumed, earlier investments in constructing the canal would have been lost. 
The Ukrainian government sought—without success—to retaliate 
with counterclaims about the transboundary environmental impact of 
Romania’s canals on Ukraine. Whereas in the late nineteenth century, the 
proportion of the Danube’s water flowing into the Tulcea Branch 
(Romania) and Kilia Arm (Ukrainian) was roughly 30/70, it is now 53/47. 
Concerns about the redistribution of the flow of Danube water align 
reserve personnel with their former opponents in Delta Lotsman and with 
local residents opposed to the reserve. Hydrologists from the Danube 
Observatory and other research institutes argue that this reduction of flow 
is leading to increased sedimentation in the Ukrainian part of the delta.79 
This is a concern for canal administrators because of the cost of dredging. 
Reserve personnel are worried because the reduced flow appears to be 
preventing the formation of the habitats that give rise to the diverse 
77 Fedorenko, Zapovednaia delta Dunaia i sudokhodstvo, 54.
78 Koyano, “Effective Implementation of International Environmental Agreements,” 
270–271.
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wetland plant and animal species that are the reason for the reserve’s exis-
tence. The dynamics of the river’s redistributed flow also accentuate the 
sedimentation of canals in the town of Vilkove—one of the town’s key 
tourist attractions.80 Ukrainian government officials’ efforts to raise this 
issue with the Espoo Convention focused on the impact of a 300m-long 
breakwater built at the beginning of the twentieth century to direct more 
water into the Tulcea Branch. However, because the Romanian channels 
and shipping infrastructure were built before the Espoo Convention came 
into effect (1998), they do not fall under its purview. 
Government officials, reserve administrators, shipping personnel, 
and ordinary citizens thus came to agree that there had been a degree of 
hypocrisy in the claims of Romanian and European officials and in the 
application of environmental regulation more strictly to Ukraine than to 
Romania. Many felt that Romania used environmental regulation to pro-
tect commercial interests and that the EU threw its weight behind an 
incoming member state. Aleksandr Vasenko, director of the Ministry of 
Environment’s Institute for Research on Ecological Problems tasked with 
monitoring the ecological impact of shipping in Ukraine’s delta expressed 
the Ukrainian government view on some of these hypocrisies. In an 
extended interview with a journalist from the Ukrainian newspaper 
Kontrakty on December 22, 2010, he responded to a question about the 
international organizations that receive environmental reports from 
Ukraine: 
We have asked the Romanians to organize joint monitoring 
research but have received no support. We addressed interna-
tional organizations and stated that we were prepared to conduct 
joint monitoring with our neighbors of the delta and the reserve 
territory which is important not just for our region and not just 
for Europe. We always emphasize that this is territory of plane-
tary significance and so we need to treat it this way. The delta is 
80 Interview with Volodymyr Egoraschenko (September 24, 2012).
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an integrated (tselostnaia) natural system, that you need to 
research as such.81 
When answering a question about whether Romania had provided 
any data to Ukraine, he made the following points: 
Romania has not provided us with a single fact that confirms 
significant impact of economic activity in the Ukrainian delta 
on its territory. . . . The Romanians . . . state that the commis-
sion from UNECE on the Espoo Convention determined six 
factors of transboundary impact, forgetting that the commis-
sion named six possible transboundary effects. However, the 
word “possible” is left out by the Romanians, and the European 
Union officials who also speak about the transboundary 
impacts as a fact. . . . But no fact exists confirming this impact. 
And the Romanian side has not provided any either . . . and so 
Ukraine constantly has to justify itself. We constantly have to 
say, “Excuse me, you are mistaken here,” “You translated this 
incorrectly.” We understand that this is not a mistake. It is a 
deliberate misrepresentation of what the Commission [on 
Espoo] wrote.82
His comments reflect these concerns and attempt to use the signifi-
cance of the delta territories for global conservation to insist on a kind of 
parity in the provision of data regarding, and in environmental concern 
for the delta. What he expressed in measured terms, other commentators 
put more bluntly. They saw continuities in the dimensions of this conflict 
between the nineteenth century, which pitted Europe against Russia, and 
the early twenty-first century in which Europe supported Romania (a 
soon-to-be EU member) against Ukraine (which was not). 
81 “Delta Dunaia: Obratnaia storona medala,” Galitskie kontrakty (December 22, 2010), 
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Meanderings in Lieu of an Ending
In his account of the Danube’s end, Magris seems ambivalent about his 
preference for Euclidean vs. fractal geometries in the delta. His book, 
which he compares to “Regulation,” is itself in need of an End.83 He finds 
it is a mistake to look for the mouth by “instinctively following the spread 
and dispersal of the little rivulets.”84 Turned back by a soldier in his quest, 
he heads to the port and then to the canal—in other words, to the 
Regulated End. Satisfaction (or relief?) comes when he is able to grasp 
“the great dissolution”—the point where the river is no longer river but 
becomes the sea.85
The politics of sedimentation discussed in this paper are about 
Regulated Ends of the Danube. In one case, failed, broken Soviet-era irri-
gation infrastructure channels pollutants from throughout Europe into a 
toxic settling pond. Although part of a Danube sub-basin, it does not 
appear on ICPDR maps. Many official documents of the Danube Basin 
and expert studies use “lake,” “reservoir,” and “lyman” interchangeably 
when referring to Sasyk. This ontological multiplicity86—both deliberately 
and inadvertently produced—perpetuates it as a very sick End to the 
Danube, one where there is no dissolution in the sea. 
In another case, competing shipping agendas clashed at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century after a period of expanding environmen-
tal regulation. The dredging of sediments in the Bystre Canal churned up 
old antagonisms between Russia and Europe. Ukraine is not Russia—as 
Ukraine’s President Leonid Kuchma famously said and as Ukraine’s 
Maidan Revolution has dramatically demonstrated. Yet it inherited some 
of its awkward dynamics with European neighbors. In the twenty-first 
century, environmental regulation, aimed at protecting ecologies that 
transcend human imposed borders, has been used in conflicts in the delta 
in ways that accentuate these older divisions in new guises. These politics 
83 Magris, Danube, 400.
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seem to have occluded a truly transboundary environmental politics 
focused on the hydrological and ecological health of the delta as a whole.
In seeking the river’s dissolution in the sea, one wonders whether 
Magris ultimately eschews a river imaginary. Does he ultimately find the 
sea a more satisfying and liberating liquid universe than the river with its 
cloying banks and the delta’s never-ending channels? Even if he does, 
Magris’ poetic and conceptual repertoire can still serve as a provocation 
for thinking with the Danube. Although rivers suggest flow and connec-
tivity, there are different ways to conceive this. Magris himself shows this 
in his evocation of Euclidean and fractal geometry when describing his 
experiences of the delta. Thinking through my own material, it strikes me 
that Euclidean geometry still predominates in the logics of contemporary 
politics of the river and its management. Let me end with some questions: 
What would it mean to embrace the river’s fractal properties or the delta’s 
oscillating matter in conceiving of the political and cultural connections 
between the inhabitants of the Danube? Could a European identity 
become fractal?87 Could this then mute the significance of national inter-
ests and identities and EU/non-EU distinctions that have remained prom-
inent features of Danube River politics? If this were the case, could 
polluted Sasyk—connected to the Danube but located outside the EU—be 
as significant for European environmental publics as the Danube Delta?
87 Donna Haraway, “Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism 
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